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Many congressional leaderswant to begin hearings thiswinter that could lead to a
new farm bill.  Nearly all interest
groups want to see an increase in
federal involvement in agriculture.
But before Iowa’s farm groups push
for a change in policy, they should
understand that, for Iowa, some
forms of government help are pre-
ferred to others, and some forms of
government assistance can actually
be harmful.
What could be wrong with
subsidies?  After all, increased
government aid puts more money in
the pockets of farmers.  But most
agricultural subsidies increase
supply, which, in turn, decreases
prices.  The negative impact of lower
prices might be greater than the
positive impact of increased aid. We
have outlined several agricultural
subsidies below and examined their
impacts.
AMTA PAYMENTS
Agricultural market transition assis-
tance (AMTA) payments are program
payments that are completely inde-
pendent of a farmer’s production
decisions and production levels.
Hence, they do not induce an in-
crease in supply.  They simply
increase cash flow to a qualifying
farm operation.
LDPS
With the loan deficiency payment
(LDP) program, all U.S. corn and
soybean farmers are guaranteed a
minimum price for all their produc-
tion.  In years when farmers expect
market prices to fall below the loan
rate, the resulting supply is greater
than it would be without the pro-
gram.  That is, in some years the loan
rate increases supply and reduces
market price.  However, this drop in
the market price does no harm to
farmers because per-bushel LDP
payments increase to fully compen-
sate for the price decrease.
CROP INSURANCE SUBSIDIES
Crop insurance subsidies promote
risky behavior by inducing more
acreage into production in areas where
crop yields are highly variable.  Thus,
the increase in crop insurance subsi-
dies in 1999 and the likely increase in
2000 will induce an increase in supply
and a lower market price for corn and
soybeans.  How likely is it that the
negative effects of a lower price will be
greater than the direct benefit that
Iowa farmers receive from crop
insurance subsidies?
First of all, we can say that in 1999
Iowa farmers were fully insulated from
a drop in market price because, as
discussed above, when the market
price is below the loan rate, a further
drop simply increases LDP payments.
Iowa farmers, therefore, should not be
concerned about the supply-enhanc-
ing effects of crop insurance subsidies
as long as the market price is below
the loan rate.  But, with any luck,
market prices for corn and soybeans
will soon rise above the loan rate.
When this occurs, will Iowa farmers
receive a net benefit from crop
insurance subsidies?
Iowa corn farmers received
approximately $53 million in crop
insurance premium subsidies in
1999.  Soybean producers received
$27 million.  Using expected 1999
production levels for Iowa, this
works out to 2.9 cents per bushel for
corn and 4.9 cents per bushel for
soybeans.  Using conservative
estimates of the impact of insurance
subsidies on supply, we calculate
that eliminating crop insurance
subsidies would increase corn prices
by at least 8 cents per bushel and
soybean prices by at least 30 cents
per bushel.  This indicates that Iowa
farmers are net losers from crop
insurance subsidies when prices are
above the loan rate.
SUPPLY CONTROLS
One of the bedrock principles of the
current farm policy is the elimination
of all government controls on supply.
Proponents of the current policy
thought that the free market was
better at guiding production deci-
sions than the government.  But
current policy is inconsistent in that
government-mandated price guaran-
tees and crop insurance subsidies
are increasing supply at a time when
the market is signaling that we have
plentiful supplies.
One way out of this inconsis-
tency is for the federal government
to put a brake on supply by return-
ing to acreage set-asides. This would
counteract the government supply
accelerator.  Some farm groups have
been convinced of the need for
supply controls.  But a full under-
standing of who really benefits from
supply controls may cause Iowa farm
groups to question the wisdom of a
return to acreage set-asides.
A reduction in supply will induce
an increase in price.  If the price
remains below the loan rate, then
farmers will not benefit from the price
increase because LDP payments
would correspondingly decrease.  If
the price rises above the loan rate
because of acreage set-asides, then the
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. . . current policy is incon-
sistent in that government-
mandated price guarantees
and crop insurance subsi-
dies are increasing supply
at a time when the market
is signaling that we have
plentiful supplies.
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benefits of the price increase are
proportionate to yields.  A farmer with
150-bushel yields will benefit by 50
percent more than will a farmer with
100-bushel yields.  So, a Kansas corn
farmer who produces 150 bushels per
acre with irrigation receives the same
benefit from the price increase as the
Iowa dryland farmer who produces
150 bushels per acre.
The cost of acreage set-asides,
however, depends on both yields
and per-acre production costs.
Cash rents for farmland are a good
measure of the relative costs of set-
asides.  If cash rents in Iowa are
$110 per acre compared to $65 per
acre in Kansas, then the cost of
acreage set-asides are nearly twice
as high in Iowa as Kansas.  In this
example, the benefits from acreage
set-asides are equal in Iowa and
Kansas, but the costs are dispropor-
tionately high in Iowa.
What we have learned from this
brief excursion into the impacts of
subsidies is that a careful examina-
tion is needed before we can con-
clude that subsidies are beneficial.
Clearly, fixed payments are beneficial
to farmers, as are price guarantees.
But, whereas the budget costs of
fixed payments are known in ad-
vance, the cost of price guarantees
can grow to unexpected levels.  If the
unexpected expense leads to supply
controls, then it is questionable
whether there is a positive net benefit
to Iowa farmers.  And, perhaps
surprisingly, the net benefits from
crop insurance subsidies are likely to
be negative for Iowa’s low-cost
producers.  That is, Iowa producers
would be better off if crop insurance
subsidies were eliminated.t
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Authors’ note: The results reported in this
analysis are dependent on a series of
assumptions relating to the functioning of
EU markets and to the future world
agricultural and macroeconomic situa-
tions. Changes in the underlying assump-
tions could significantly alter the results
reported in this article.  For further
discussion of the Berlin Accord reforms,
see CARD Briefing Paper 99-BP 24,
“Analysis of the Berlin Accord Reforms to
the European Union’s Common Agricul-
tural Policy,” available online at http://
www.card.iastate.edu.
The European Union’s (EU)Common Agricultural Policy(CAP) is set to undergo com-
prehensive reforms, known as Agenda
2000, next year.  The twofold objective
of these reforms is to ensure the
sustainability of European agriculture
and to protect the livelihood of
European farmers.  In May 1999, the
European Council officially adopted
new financial and political guide-
lines—dubbed the Berlin Accord—
that will increase government support
to farmers through direct payments
while reducing support prices for
cereals, beef, and dairy products.
The Berlin Accord reforms are
likely to stimulate increased produc-
tion in the EU and thereby create
substantial changes in European
agricultural markets. The overall
impact on markets for Iowa crops
and livestock, however, is projected
to be relatively small.  Farm prices
for corn, soybeans, and oats are
modestly changed and, on average,
decline by 1 percent between 2001
and 2008. The expanded cereals
production in the EU will lead to
slightly lower world wheat prices
and lower U.S. exports. Iowa beef
and hog prices increase slightly in
the first two years of the reform
implementations; then, for the
remaining period, Iowa livestock
prices decline relative to the
baseline.
FAPRI (Food and Agricultural
Policy Research Institute) at the
Center for Rural and Agricultural
Development (CARD) conducted an
analysis that estimates the impacts
of the Berlin Accord for EU agricul-
tural markets. The analysis results
were contrasted with a baseline
scenario that maintains pre-Accord
policies. The FAPRI modeling system
incorporates forecasts of macroeco-
nomic variables—such as gross
domestic product, inflation rates,
and exchange rates—that were
obtained from Standard and Poors
DRI, Project Link, and WEFA. Weather
was assumed to be average during
the projection period.
EFFECTS ON EU AGRICULTURE
For crops, the CAP support prices
for cereals is reduced by 15 percent
in two steps, with the first reduction
occurring during the 2000/01 market-
ing year.  Cereals producers in the
EU will be compensated for this
reduction by an increase in direct
payments from 54.34 to 63 euros per
metric ton (1 euro = $.93).  Payments
to oilseed producers will be progres-
sively reduced to the level for
cereals by the 2002/03 marketing
year.  Producers of legumes and
pulses (protein substitutes) will
receive a direct payment of 9.5 euros
per metric ton on top of the basic
direct payment.
For beef, the support price is
reduced by 20 percent over a three-
year period. Then, in July 2002, the
intervention price will be replaced
by a beef basic price of 2224 euros
per metric ton, and a private storage
aid scheme will be introduced.  All
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